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Abstract: Stacie Friend’s theory of fiction departs from those ap-
proaches that seek to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a work to count as fiction. She argues that this goal cannot really 
be achieved; instead, she appeals to the notion of genre to distinguish 
between fiction and nonfiction. This notion is significantly more flex-
ible, since it invites us to identify standard—but not necessary—and 
counter-standard features of works of fiction in light of our classifi-
catory practices. More specifically, Friend argues that the genre of 
fiction has the genre of nonfiction—and only that genre—as its con-
trast class. I will refer to the particular way in which Friend elabo-
rates this claim as the contrast view. I have, nevertheless, the impres-
sion that this view unnecessarily narrows down the array of perspec-
tives and attitudes from which we can approach works of fiction. 
I will thus develop a line of reasoning to the effect that the contrast 
view should rather be construed as picking out a particular way of 
relating to works of fiction that lies at the end of a continuum defined 
by different degrees of reflectivity and estrangement. This implies 
that the contrast view is false as a general claim about how we expe-
rience works of fiction, even though this view may appropriately de-
pict a specific way of approaching such works. 
Keywords: Fiction; genre; parenthetical; ritual; theatricality. 
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 A theory of fiction must ultimately account for the role of fiction in our 
practices and institutions. We can certainly delimit a domain for which 
a specific theory of fiction could be developed, provided that such a delim-
itation enhances our understanding of the phenomenon of fiction in this 
particular domain. I take it that the theory of fiction that Stacie Friend 
proposes has this localized or partial character, since it focuses exclusively 
on works of fiction, leaving aside any other manifestation of the phenome-
non of fiction. The line of argument in this paper might ultimately be con-
strued as an attempt to show that the way she delimits works of fiction 
fails to meet the explanatory constraint I just mentioned, namely: that it 
should enhance our understanding of the role of fiction in this particular 
domain. But the specific purpose of this paper is rather more modest and 
will focus on a particular claim in Friend’s theory of fiction. 
 Friend’s approach departs from those theories of fiction that seek to 
identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a work to count as fic-
tion. She argues that this goal cannot really be achieved; instead, she ap-
peals to the notion of genre to distinguish between fiction and nonfiction. 
This notion is significantly more flexible, since it invites us to identify stand-
ard—but not necessary—and counter-standard features of works of fiction 
in light of our classificatory practices. More specifically, Friend argues that 
the genre of fiction has the genre of nonfiction—and only that genre—as its 
contrast class. I will refer to the particular way in which Friend elaborates 
this claim as the contrast view. I have, nevertheless, the impression that 
this view unnecessarily narrows down the array of perspectives and atti-
tudes from which we can approach works of fiction. I will thus develop 
a line of reasoning to the effect that the contrast view should rather be 
construed as picking out a particular way of relating to works of fiction that 
lies at end of a continuum defined by different degrees of reflectivity and 
estrangement. This implies that the contrast view is false as a general claim 
about how we experience works of fiction, even though this view may ap-
propriately depict a specific way of approaching such works. 
 This paper is structured as follows. In section 1, I will briefly present 
Friend’s approach to fiction as a genre as well as the contrast view as she 
defends it. In section 2, I will examine a passage from Robert Musil’s The 
Man Without Qualities, in which Ulrich, the protagonist, compares his  
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Excellency’s sense of theatricality with that of a play staged in a theater to 
entertain the middle class; while the former seems integrated into His Ex-
cellency’s life, the latter responds to a rather divided and schizoid life that 
manifests itself in many other practices such as the way in which the middle 
class participate in religious services or how bourgeois males conceive of 
their sexual activities. We may thus say that middle class members experi-
ence fiction as parenthetical with regard to their daily lives. Needless to 
say, this parentheticality1 squares quite nicely with the contrast view, even 
though it leaves out other sorts of attitudes toward fiction that may be 
present not only in His Excellency’s sophisticated conversation but in many 
other rituals and practices, such as a family meal or a conversation between 
friends. In sections 3 and 4, I will further elaborate this proposal by ad-
dressing two objections that could be raised against the idea that His Ex-
cellency’s conversation—and some other practices and rituals—may actu-
ally challenge the contrast view. In section 3, I will thus examine the most 
obvious objection, namely, that this conversation may be a case where the-
atricality or fictionality is involved, but it could hardly count as a work of 
fiction. Hence, insofar as Friend’s account is exclusively concerned with 
works of fiction, Ulrich’s remarks fail to provide a straightforward case 
against the contrast view. I will reply, however, that our reluctance to iden-
tify His Excellency’s conversation and many other practices and rituals as 
works of fiction presupposes in turn the contrast view and, more specifically, 
the idea that parentheticality as an all-or-nothing matter is a crucial feature 
that works of fiction standardly possess and non-fiction standardly lack. 
Hence, no independent argument seems to have been provided to deny that 
His Excellency’s conversation or a family meal could count as a work of 
fiction. In any event, it seems that only parentheticality as an all-or-nothing 
matter stands in the way of regarding some rituals and practices as works 
of fiction. In section 4, I will argue however that parentheticality comes in 
degrees and that, once conceived of in this way, it can easily be recognized 
as a rather common phenomenon. Thus, I will conclude that the contrast 
view is false insofar as (a) it presupposes that parentheticality is an all-or-
                                                 
1  ‘Parentheticality’ is a neologism that I have finally decided to employ in this 
paper for the sake of simplicity. It refers to the ability to experience a certain activity 
as parenthetical or encapsulated with regard to one’s ordinary life. 
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nothing matter, and (b) His Excellency’s conversation does not constitute 
an exceptional case but a manifestation of an attitude that is present in 
many of our practices and rituals that, once we acknowledge the gradual 
nature of parentheticality, can easily be recognized as works of fiction. 
Hence, I will conclude that, if we are to understand how we experience 
and evaluate of works of fiction and theatricality, we better accept that 
the contrast view is false and also that the experience of fiction as the 
contrast class of nonfiction constitutes a rather specific—however, domi-
nant in our cultural context—way of relating to works of fiction that lies 
at the extreme of a continuum with various degrees of reflectivity and es-
trangement. 
1. Fiction as a genre 
 According to Stacie Friend, a theory of fiction must address the two 
following questions: “First, what are the criteria of membership in each 
category? And second, what are the effects of classification on our engage-
ment with particular works?” (Friend 2012, 180) She sees these questions 
as closely interlocked because a suitable criterion must not only fit with our 
pre-theoretical intuitions about fiction and nonfiction but meet an explan-
atory constraint, namely: it must account for the effects of classification on 
our engagement with a certain work.  
 Standard theories of fiction assume that an answer to the first question 
must provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular work 
to qualify as fiction or as nonfiction. The most promising among such the-
ories view fiction as a prescription to imagine and nonfiction as an invitation 
to believe. These theories must handle in one way or another the fact, how-
ever, that some works of nonfiction do include an invitation to imagine and 
works of fiction frequently comprise statements that the reader is assumed 
to believe. For this purpose, some theories of fiction have shifted from works 
to statements and have focused on the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for both fictive and nonfictive statements. Works of fiction would, as a re-
sult, come up as a patchwork of fictive and nonfictive statements (Currie 
1990, 49). 
86  Josep E. Corbí 
Organon F 27 (1) 2020: 82–105 
 Friend objects, though, that this kind of approach can hardly address 
the second question, that is, shed some light on how a certain combination 
of fictive and nonfictive statements may invite a specific, unified attitude 
toward a certain work, instead of a continuous shift from imagining to be-
lieving, and vice versa. This is the patchwork problem in Friend’s terms 
(Stock 2011; Friend 2011). She then leaves aside this project and explores 
an alternative approach. In particular, Friend proposes treating fiction as 
a genre, and nonfiction as its contrast class:  
Classification as fiction or nonfiction, like classification in other 
genres or categories of art, influences the way we experience, un-
derstand and evaluate a work by specifying a contrast class 
against which the work’s properties stand out as being standard, 
counter-standard or variable. (Friend 2012, 188) 
 A work will thus count as fiction inasmuch as it possesses some standard 
features that are identified as such within certain categorization practices.2 
A standard feature is not a necessary condition, since counter-standard fea-
tures often serve some narrative purpose that may eventually enhance the 
aesthetic value of a work, as happens with Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood 
or Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire. More specifically, Friend identifies the 
actual genre of a certain work in terms of a cluster of non-essential criteria 
that include not only some standard features as they are identified within 
contemporary practices of categorization but the author’s intentions as well:  
As with other genres and categories of art, classification turns on 
a cluster of non-essential criteria: the possession of standard fea-
tures (including those identified by fictive utterance theorists), 
the intention of the author that the work be read in a particular 
category, and the conventions associated with contemporary cat-
egorization practices. (Friend 2012, 195)  
                                                 
2  “In attempting to distinguish between fiction and nonfiction, we should consider, 
not how the parts of a work add up to the whole, but instead how the whole work 
is embedded in a larger context: in particular, the practices of reading, writing, 
publishing, and so on. I therefore construe fiction and nonfiction as different genres 
into which works may be categorized” (Friend 2011, 175). 
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 As we see, the intention of the author Friend is concerned with does not 
consist in an invitation or prescription to either imagine or believe, as some 
standard theories might assume, but has to do with the idea of producing 
“a work in a certain category. The fact that Tacitus intends readers to 
engage in mere-make-believe is not in conflict with his intention to write 
nonfiction history, and it is the latter, not the former, that matters for 
classification” (Friend 2008, 165).3 
 What are, though, the standard features of fiction and nonfiction? De-
spite Friend’s impulse to depart from standard theories of fiction, much of 
what she says when distinguishing between fiction and nonfiction relies on 
dichotomies that are central to those theories, such as the contrast between 
asserting and inventing, between believing and imagining, or between 
names that refer and names that fail to do so:  
If we take a text to be fiction, for example, we will expect it to 
engage us imaginatively through narrative; to deploy certain lit-
erary devices; to include invented elements, such as descriptions 
of what has never happened and names that fail to refer; to make 
                                                 
3  This appeal to the author’s classificatory intentions may conflict with the role 
ascribed to contemporary categorization practices as the context where the standard 
features of fiction are to be determined, for the intention to produce a work in a cer-
tain category could only be relative to the categorization practices of the time, which 
may in turn differ from the contemporary ones so that a significant number of fea-
tures that were standard at the time are not so at present, and vice versa. It follows 
that a work might eventually qualify as fiction in light of the categorization practices 
of the time when it was produced and as nonfiction according to contemporary ca-
tegorization practices. 
 Some might reply, however, that there must be some continuity among such 
categorization practices for them to be identified as being concerned with fiction as 
opposed to some other category. This emphasis on continuity across variations in 
our categorization practices fits quite nicely with Friend’s approach and, more spe-
cifically, with her claim that counter-standard features may eventually play a rele-
vant narrative function. It is still unclear whether this continuity across time will 
suffice to ground the claim I intend to challenge, namely: that fiction and nonfiction 
are each other’s contrast class. Even though this claim were true of our contemporary 
categorization practices, it may be rather alien to those practices at the time the 
work in question was produced.  
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claims that are not assertions by the author; and so on. If we take 
a work to be a nonfiction, on the other hand, we will expect an 
effort to be faithful to the facts; references to real people, places 
and events; assertions that convey the author’s views; and so 
forth. (Friend 2012, 189)  
 As it goes, it seems that the main disparity between standard theories 
and Friend’s approach does not lie so much in the sort of features relevant 
to the process of categorization, but in the fact that Friend does not view 
those features as necessary—and all together sufficient—conditions but as 
forming a cluster of non-essential standard features, so that a certain work 
may include some counter-standard features of fiction and still count as 
such. Friend is committed to contextualism insofar as she assumes that 
categorization of a work as fiction or as nonfiction depends on some cate-
gorizing practices that may vary over time. Some features that are regarded 
as counter-standard at some point may become standard at some later 
stage, and vice versa. Still, the fact that fiction and nonfiction are each 
other’s contrast class is not presented as contextual; on the contrary, the 
contrast view is a philosophical claim about the genre of fiction and as such 
it is supposed to hold across all contexts. 
 Be it as it may, Friend does not present the distinction between fiction 
and nonfiction as either exhaustive or exclusive (Friend 2012, 205). Regard-
ing exclusiveness, she argues that some works can reasonably be approached 
both as fiction and as nonfiction, although, of course, they will be experi-
enced, understood and evaluated differently in each case. It seems, however, 
that exclusiveness should apply to paradigmatic cases of either class, since, 
if we were to allow for each work to be alternatively approached as fiction 
and as nonfiction, it is unclear whether we could coherently specify what 
approaching a certain work in one way or the other may consist of. We can, 
indeed, mention the reader’s specific attitude in each case, but the question 
is how the content of this attitude is to be individuated if we cannot point 
out some paradigmatic cases that are presented as exclusively fiction or 
nonfiction.4 In any event, Friend also rejects exhaustiveness because neither 
                                                 
4  A similar perplexity will be raised when considering in section 3 whether Friend 
can provide a non-viciously circular criterion to reject some rituals as works of fiction. 
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fiction nor nonfiction is individuated by a sheer denial of the standard fea-
tures of their respective contrast class; therefore, some specific works may 
fail to sufficiently meet the standard features in both categories. It is clear, 
however, that the contrast view can only survive if such cases do not spread, 
that is, if they are rather exceptional, for, otherwise, there is no clear sense 
in which fiction and nonfiction could still count as each other’s contrast 
class.  
 So far so good regarding the virtues of fiction as a genre to provide 
a demarcation criterion that tracks our pre-theoretical intuitions regarding 
the distinction between fiction and nonfiction. Friend stresses, however, 
that any suitable demarcation criterion must also meet a certain explana-
tory demand, namely, that it must make sense of how classifying a work as 
fiction or as nonfiction influences our experience, understanding and evalu-
ation of a given work.  
 Friend is convinced that standard theories of fiction fail not only because 
they are unable to specify a demarcation criterion that tracks our pre-the-
oretical intuitions about the contrast between fiction and nonfiction, but 
also because the most promising standard theories fail to provide the re-
quired explanation, since, according to Friend, they incur the patchwork 
problem and, therefore, there is no way in which they could make sense of 
a unified attitude toward a work of fiction. Apparently, Friend’s account in 
terms of genre does not face this problem, since fiction is no longer identified 
as a suitable combination of fictive and nonfictive statements but by a clus-
ter of non-essential features in the context of our contemporary categoriza-
tion practices. It is in light of this cluster that the appropriate attitude on 
the side of the reader toward a certain work is determined. The assumption 
is that contemporary categorization practices deliver a unified attitude to-
ward a work of fiction that contrasts with the attitude toward a work of 
nonfiction. And this is why Friend concludes that a view of fiction as a genre 
provides a demarcation criterion that satisfies the explanatory demand she 
placed for any successful theory of fiction. 
 Friend emphasizes that a proper demarcation criterion must account for 
how the classification of a work as a work of fiction influences our attitude 
toward it, but her understanding of fiction as a genre obliges her to recog-
nize that the way we experience, understand and evaluate a work must in 
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turn contribute, in an exercise of reflective equilibrium (Goodman 1983, 62-
63; Rawls 1999, 19, 42; 2001, 29-32; Ryle 2008, Ch. 2), to determining how 
it is to be classified. Hence, I take it that Friend should recognize that her 
demarcation criterion must meet an explanatory demand that goes both 
ways, that is, how classification conditions our attitude toward a certain 
work but also how our attitude contributes to the way it is classified. This 
explanatory constraint forces us to examine the different ways in which we 
relate to works of fiction. Specifically, in the following section, I will suggest 
that the presence of theatricality in aristocratic manners challenges a cen-
tral aspect of Friend’s theory, namely: her eagerness to understand works 
of fiction as opposed exclusively to nonfiction, as if there were not many 
other—and genuinely significant—ways in which we may relate to works of 
fiction. In sections 3 and 4, I will elaborate my suggestion by addressing 
two objections that could be raised against the idea that the theatricality 
of some practices and rituals might actually challenge the contrast view.  
2. Aristocratic manners 
 Ulrich, the protagonist of The Man Without Qualities by Robert Musil, 
spots a theatrical instinct in the aristocratic manners of his Excellency. He 
compares such theatrical instinct with the middle-class custom of going to 
the theater, as an art that can be rented at a modest price: 
Ulrich had time for such reflections because he had to wait awhile 
for His Excellency to speak. The theatrical instinct for disguise 
and transformation, one of life’s pleasure, could here be seen in 
all its purity, without the least taint or awareness of a perfor-
mance; so strongly did it manifest itself here in this unconscious, 
perennial art of self-representation that by comparison the mid-
dle-class custom of building theaters and staging plays as an art 
that can be rented by the hour struck him as something quite 
unnatural, decadent, and schizoid. (Musil 1995, 85) 
 As we see, Ulrich places within the domain of theatricality both the 
behavior of his Excellency and a performance on the stage. He associates 
theatricality with a taste for disguise and transformation. He is surprised, 
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however, by the fact that his Excellency manifests no awareness of a per-
formance, while staging a play in a theater requires two sorts of awareness 
on the side of both actors and spectators: one focused on the content of the 
play itself and another oriented toward their real lives. Friend’s approach 
to the genre of fiction seems to regard this split between two forms of 
awareness as an important standard feature of works of fiction. After all, 
she opposes inventing to asserting, imagining to believing, what one actress 
pretends to be to what she really is offstage. By contrast, Ulrich does not 
regard this schizoid form of awareness as constitutive of theatricality; he 
interprets his conversation with his Excellency as theatrical despite the ab-
sence of such a split or dissociation: 
And when His Excellency finally parted his lips and said to him: 
‘Your dear father…’ only to come to a halt, there was something 
in his voice that made one notice his remarkably beautiful yel-
lowish hands and something like an aura of finely tuned morality 
surrounding the whole figure, which charmed Ulrich into forget-
ting himself, as intellectuals are apt to do. For His Excellency 
now asked him what he did, and when Ulrich said ‘Mathematics’ 
responded with ‘Indeed, how interesting, at which school?’ When 
Ulrich assured him that he had nothing to do with schools, His 
Excellency said, ‘Indeed, how interesting, I see, research, univer-
sity.’ This seemed to Ulrich so natural and precise, just the way 
one imagines a fine piece of conversation, that he inadvertently 
took to behaving as though he were at home here and followed 
his thoughts instead of the protocol demanded by the situation. 
(Musil 1995, 85) 
 In the kind of theatricality that inspires this conversation, Ulrich feels 
unified with the protocol; he follows its constraints as if he were following 
his own trend of thought; he is not complying with some external demands. 
The idea of the unity of our conscience emerges again as essential to a kind 
of theatricality that Ulrich vindicates as superior. This unity opposes to the 
divided experience that prevails in the ordinary life of the middle-class, as 
it manifests itself not only when they go to the theater, but also in the way 
members of this class participate in a religious service or in how middle-
class men experience their sexual activities: 
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‘How much more beautiful she is when she goes wild,’ Ulrich 
thought, ‘but how mechanically it all finished again.’ The sight 
of her had excited him and enticed him to make love to her, but 
now that it was done he felt again how little it had to do with 
him personally. Another abundantly clear demonstration of how 
a healthy man can be turned with incredible speed into a frothing 
lunatic. But this erotic transformation of the consciousness 
seemed only a special instance of something much more general: 
for an evening at the theater, a concert, a church service, all such 
manifestations of the inner life today are similar, quickly dissolv-
ing islands of a second state of consciousness that is sometimes 
interpolated into the ordinary use. (Musil 1995, 119) 
 If Ulrich were right in his description of middle-class awareness as schiz-
oid or split and in his view of the art of his Excellency as theatrical despite 
the absence of a divided consciousness, we should then acknowledge that 
Friend’s characterization of the genre of fiction suits only the kind of the-
atricality that is typical of the middle class. For in such cases fiction has 
nonfiction as its contrast class, since fiction as experienced by the middle 
class presupposes a divided kind of awareness, namely, a sense of parenthe-
ticality or encapsulation from their daily affairs and concerns. But this is 
not at all what happens when his Excellency cultivates his outstanding the-
atrical instinct: there is not a real life external to his theatrical experience, 
no private life waiting for his Excellency once his conversation with Ulrich 
is over. His Excellency’s identity is not divided between his public and his 
private life; the manners that inspire his conversation with Ulrich constitute 
the fabric of his entire life, the terms in which he will assess its failure or 
success.5 All this suggests that the contrast view may misrepresent the genre 
                                                 
5  In The Remains of the Day (Ishiguro 1989), we hear the narrative of an English 
butler who takes very seriously the demands of his profession; still he has a private 
room where he relaxes at the end of the day and any interference is regarded as 
intrusive; moreover, the title of the novel points to those days that remain once 
retired as an opportunity to reconsider the value of his life as a butler and to initiate 
a new life of his own. By contrast, the protagonist in An Artist in a Floating World 
(Ishiguro 1986), a Japanese artist confesses his state of despondency after the defeat 
in the World War II, but the way he examines his life leaves no room for a sphere 
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of fiction because it inadvertently focuses on some specific social practices 
leaving aside other ways in which works of fiction may be experienced, 
understood and evaluated. There are various reasons, however, why the 
presence of theatricality in his Excellency’s conversation may be discarded 
as irrelevant to the contrast view. In section 3, I will address the most 
obvious complaint: the contrast view is exclusively concerned with works of 
fiction and His Excellency’s conversation could hardly be identified as such. 
I will conclude that only the assumption of parentheticality as an all-or-
nothing matter stands in the way of acknowledging that certain practices 
and rituals can be approached as works of fiction. Hence, in section 4, I will 
defend the claim that, contrary to what the contrast view assumes, paren-
theticality is a matter of degree and, as a result, I will conclude that those 
cases where fiction has nonfiction as its contrast class constitute a rather 
specific attitude toward works of fiction and theatricality that lies at the 
extreme of a continuum with various degrees of reflectivity and estrange-
ment. 
3. Theatricality and works of fiction 
 To begin with, Friend might certainly object to an unduly transition 
from theatricality to works of fiction in my previous remarks. Ulrich’s con-
siderations dwell on the idea of theatricality but there may be a long way 
from theatricality to fiction or, more specifically, we may allow for forms of 
theatricality that are alien to works of fiction. And nothing in Ulrich’s ob-
servations makes us think that his Excellency’s delight in theatricality in-
volved the notion of a work of fiction. After all, we may admit that theat-
ricality is overwhelmingly present in our social rituals but this does not 
make of them works of fiction. 
 Let us examine carefully, however, what a theater play consists of, for 
it may not be so easy to deny that some rituals are theatre plays; in fact, 
we may ultimately be forced to recognize that those rituals are after all 
                                                 
of privacy, alien to the strict rules and values that govern his social environment. 
The sort of unity that articulate his life is also present in Il Gatopardo (Visconti 
1963), where the Prince has no existence external to his aristocratic condition. 
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works of fiction. To begin with, we could say that theatre plays admit—
and often require—actresses and actors to improvise. The script sets out 
some guidelines but the actress has to breathe life into them, fill in the gaps, 
improvise to a larger or lesser degree. We could thus say that Ulrich’s con-
versation with His Excellency adjusts to the idea of a script on which one 
improvises more or less skillfully. And this applies to all activities in which 
His Excellency may participate without distinguishing between a public and 
a private domain.  
 Friend could retort—as she did in conversation—that the works of fic-
tion she had in mind only concerns written texts, scripts, regardless of their 
specific implementation in one or another performance.6 At first glance, this 
restriction seems somewhat arbitrary. Why should a work of fiction be only 
a text? Isn’t a film a work of fiction? Should we consider that only the 
script is? After all, a theatre play, even if it is not staged, is a text whose 
point depends on its being staged by some actresses and actors. We can 
disregard any particular staging but we must still rely on the idea that it 
has to be staged.  
 Some could reply, however, that the existence of a written text is at 
least a necessary condition for the existence of a work of fiction while Ul-
rich’s conversation with His Excellency is not inspired by any particular 
text. It is clear, however, that the words and props that compose a theat-
rical play or a work of fiction could respond to guidelines that are transmit-
ted orally. This is the case with the stories that my grandmother told me, 
which only in some cases—and accidentally—had been put in writing. So, 
it does not seem essential that the words that a work is composed of are 
put in writing for it to exist.  
 Moreover, just as some rituals are more structured than others, there 
are also theater plays that are more freestyle than others. There are, indeed, 
some theater plays that are performed on a stage, but many others tend to 
blur the idea of a stage by mixing actors and audience. In this case, the 
story is always in a process of elaboration and the particular words used in 
                                                 
6  “My focus is on fiction as a representational work, contrasted with the category 
of non-fiction” (Friend forthcoming, Ch. 1). “The concept of fiction is familiar… As 
these examples suggest, the categories of fiction and nonfiction apply first and fo-
remost to works [as opposed to parts of works]” (Friend forthcoming, Ch. 1). 
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each performance will depend on how each particular audience responds. 
The linguistic fabric thus created is as ephemeral as a conversation might 
be. Of course, nothing prevents that fabric from being put in writing, but 
the same goes for the guidelines and directives of His Excellency’s conver-
sations, which could easily be reflected in a protocol book. All this corrob-
orates the accidental character of the connection between writing and the-
ater or, in general, between writing and works of fiction. 
 Friend could object that the absence of a text is a counter-standard 
feature—i.e., a feature that deviates from the standard of a previously writ-
ten text—that some plays may use as an aesthetic resource. In reply to this, 
I should firstly say that it is far from clear that such a feature is genuinely 
counter-standard at the moment, but, even if it were, it would again be 
a totally accidental circumstance. We could easily imagine a context where 
they were standard and, therefore, it would be quite unreasonable to ground 
a theory of fiction—whose claims are not meant to be just contextually 
true—on such a circumstantial aspect of our theatrical practice. And, sec-
ondly, I should mention that sometimes the expressive potential of the 
above-mentioned feature, namely, the one that Friend might regard as 
counter-standard, lies precisely in the ability to highlight the continuity 
between theater plays and other practices in which we also use a script and 
improvise with greater or lesser success. Such practices include Ulrich’s con-
versation with His Excellency, but also many other less striking practices, 
such as a conversation between friends or a family meal, whose scripts may 
certainly vary from one to another culture or context. 
 One could insist, however, that a script open to improvisation is not 
enough for the creation of a theater play, not even for the presence of the-
atricality. Religious rituals respond to a script and are open to a certain 
degree of improvisation, but they are not theater plays. But what else is 
then required to produce a theater play? Perhaps, the fact that the script 
is invented and also that it includes invented characters, that is, characters 
who are known not to exist.  
 It is true that this last condition may be fulfilled by many works of 
fiction but, as Friend herself stresses, it is far from being a necessary con-
dition, for there are many works of fiction that, in a more or less direct way, 
speak about events that have really happened or people that do exist or 
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have existed, even though they are often adorned or elaborated with in-
vented or counterfactual features. Friend could reply, though, that her the-
ory of fiction is not concerned with providing necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for fiction, but only standard, counter-standard and variable fea-
tures, whereby my reply may sound irrelevant.  
 However, once we realize that the presence of invented characters is not 
a necessary condition for fiction, it is easy to show that the fact that this 
feature may turn out to be standard depends on the context. Thus, I will 
later suggest that there are a number of relevant contexts where this feature 
is not standard but just variable. Enough for now regarding invented char-
acters; as to the invented nature of the script itself, haven’t we invented 
the script of our conversations? Are they not, after all, institutions that we 
have created?  
 Maybe then what is missing in a conversation between friends or in 
a family meal is that participants are not aware of following a script. Should 
we then accept that, if the participants were aware of this circumstance, 
a family meal would thereby become a theater play? But such awareness is 
often present in our practices and celebrations; let us think, for example, of 
the rituals involved in a Christmas meal.7 Some participants may be aware 
of a script, but do people act in such circumstances in the way actresses 
and actors do on the stage? The answer to this question may depend on 
whether a certain participant may identify herself with that ritual; in the 
event that no such identification occurs, one could participate in a Christ-
mas meal the way a member of a rental family might do, as the film Familia 
(León Arenoa, 1996)) so comically depicts. In this movie, the protagonist, 
Santiago, rents a party of actors and actress to act as his relatives for his 
55th birthday. The action runs for 24 hours in Santiago’s country house. But 
all this is unknown to the viewers who for a long while are convinced that 
they are just watching a movie whose plot revolves around a family gath-
ering to celebrate Santiago’s birthday. Their naive approach is apparently 
confirmed by the fact that Santiago angrily manifests his dislike for his son’s 
                                                 
7  The specific rituals associated with a Christmas meal will certainly vary from 
one family to another and from one to another culture; still, such meals tend to be 
highly ritualized, so that certain attitudes and behavior are normatively required 
and expected. 
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present or even when Santiago claims that his son is insincere when the 
latter claims to love him. From time to time, some details strike us as 
strange, though; like when the protagonist complains that he had not or-
dered a child with glasses, but the viewers may still leave aside such remarks 
as a joke or a peculiarity of the script. Little by little, however, it becomes 
clear that all these people are just members of a theater company that 
Santiago has rented to perform a birthday celebration. Perhaps, Friend 
would like to reserve the idea of a theater play to a certain kind of partici-
pation in this performance, namely, as a member of the rental family. But 
this proposal sounds rather arbitrary at this stage. In fact, the movie invites 
us to distinguish how actors and actress participate in the celebration from 
Santiago’s own attitude toward the situation, given that the latter’s aspi-
ration is to feel for a few hours that he does have a family after all, that is, 
to experience for a while that family as his own. But the contrast between 
the members of the rented family and Santiago himself suggest the plurality 
of our relationship to a script and, therefore, that our attitude toward it is 
not confined to the contrast between fiction and non-fiction, that is, to the 
contrast between an actress onstage and offstage.  
 Friend might, nevertheless, reply that Santiago is not really confronting 
the script as a work of fiction and, as a result, stick to the idea that a the-
ater play is only such if we relate to the script the way the members of 
a rented family do. However, this response sounds viciously circular. If a de-
marcation criterion is to be of any interest, it is necessary to identify in 
advance the set of objects for which one intends to offer such a criterion; 
otherwise, any criterion would be trivially correct. However, if the criterion 
to demarcate a set of objects depends on whether we have a certain attitude 
toward them and any object before which we do not have that attitude is 
excluded from the set, then this demarcation criterion becomes trivial and 
devoid of any explanatory power, contrary to the explanatory constraint 
that Friend herself proposed for an adequate theory of fiction proposed. The 
only way to avoid this circularity is to have a preliminary classification of 
the objects at issue and then, in an exercise of reflective equilibrium, to 
elucidate the criteria to which this classificatory practice may respond to. 
From this point of view, it does not seem that Friend could so easily reject 
that there is a variety of ways in which a family celebration may be  
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experienced as a work of fiction. Thus, we should include that of the mem-
bers of the theater company, Santiago’s and even our experience in those 
situations where we may not feel seated at the table with our own family 
but with a provisionally adopted or an adoptive family. Quite often it is 
not so much that we feel that we are not seated with our own family, but 
rather that our way of being there has lost the naturalness that we attribute 
to our childhood or, in other words, that our experiences as adults imply 
a degree of reflectivity and estrangement similar to that of our relationship 
with a family that we adopt in order to relieve the sorrows of emigration or 
exile, or a family that adopts us in our orphanage.8 
 All this seems to lead us to the extravagant conclusion that a family 
meal is a work of fiction; but is it really so extravagant? That it seems so 
extravagant responds, in my opinion, to the tendency to conceive of our life 
as divided and, therefore, to leave aside or misinterpret any practice that 
does not respond to this pattern. We could, however, imagine some social 
contexts were performances on stage were an extreme case of theatricality, 
like in a society in which people called ‘guernicas’ bas-reliefs similar to Pablo 
Picasso’s Guernica. In this context, the latter would appear as peculiar for 
its bidimensionality. This example, suggested by Friend herself, shows that 
the fact that a certain feature is standard or counter-standard depends on 
the context.9 Relatedly, I will argue that the relevant class of contrast when 
                                                 
8  See, in this respect, Truffaut (1959, 1968, 1970, 1979) whose protagonist needs 
so desperately to adopt a family that he seems to fall in love only with girls who are 
members of an ordinary, respectable family, and also Livingston (1990) and Butler 
(1993) regarding the ball culture developed in New York City by some Afro-Ame-
rican, Latino, gay and transgender communities. Participants in these balls are ar-
ranged in ‘houses’ whose masters are referred to as mothers because of the complex, 
protective role they play in their lives. All this suggests that such houses act as 
surrogate families for their otherwise abandoned and isolated members.  
9  “As a painting Guernica’s flatness counts as standard, but as a guernica that is 
the most salient feature of the work, the one that distinguishes it from other works 
of the same kind… What has happened here is that we have switched the relevant 
contrast class: the set of works with which the work of in question is compared, a set 
with different standard, contra-standard, and variable features. As a result of the 
switch, we focus on different features of the work, taking some features as more 
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relating to works of fiction may equally vary from one to another context. 
Some might think that contextualism should not be a problem for Friend’s 
approach, given she is remarkably a contextualist concerning those features 
that may be regarded as standard for a work of fiction. Still, Friend could 
hardly be a contextualist with respect to the contrast view itself, given that 
as a philosophical claim this view should hold across all contexts. Hence, it 
seems that the contrast view must presuppose that parentheticality holds 
across all contexts; moreover, it can be argued that the contrast view must 
conceive of parentheticality as an all-or nothing matter because, otherwise, 
the transition from fiction to nonfiction—or vice versa—ought to be ap-
proached as a continuum, contrary to what the contrast view trivially de-
fends. Hence, we can conclude that the contrast view presupposes that par-
entheticality is an all-or-nothing matter that holds across all contexts. This 
is, however, the presupposition I intend to dispute in the next section. 
4. Parentheticality 
 In section 2, I argued that the contrast view is committed to the claim 
that our relation to works of fiction involves the idea of a parenthesis and, 
therefore, to the claim that the split between two sorts of awareness that 
Ulrich presents as constitutive of the way the middle-class experiences the-
ater, sex and religious services is necessarily a standard feature of fiction. 
Ulrich is convinced, however, that theatricality does not require such a pa-
renthesis and can be imbricated in our daily practices and rituals. Besides, 
I have just suggested that what stands in the way of regarding such prac-
tices and rituals as works of fiction is just an understanding of parentheti-
cality as an all-or-nothing matter. Now, I will examine a number of practices 
and rituals to vindicate a gradual understanding of parentheticality. But, 
before engaging in this discussion, it may be relevant to introduce a termi-
nological qualification. So far, I have been referring to works of fiction as 
the main target of my exploration given that this is the explicit purpose of 
the contrast view. But, from now on, I will mainly talk of fiction in general, 
                                                 
salient and foregrounding these while leaving others in the background” (Friend 
forthcoming, Ch. 3). 
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without confining myself to works of fiction. To motivate this shift I will 
rely on the conclusion reached in the previous section, namely: that many 
of our activities and rituals could be understood as works of fiction, only if 
parentheticality were not an all-or-nothing matter. Hence, if I succeeded in 
motivating that parentheticality is a gradual matter in some such activities, 
I would also have proved that the parentheticality of our relation to works 
of fiction should be construed as a matter of degree and, therefore, that 
some of our activities and rituals can legitimately be individuated as works 
of fiction and such that the contrast view will turn out to be false. Let me 
now sketch a defense of the gradual nature of parentheticality. 
 My discussion in the previous section already suggests that parentheti-
cality is a matter of degree. There, I stressed the plural ways in which 
a person may regard a certain group of people as her family, namely: as 
a member of a rental family, as the renter of such family, as an exile who 
forms a temporary family with their compatriots, or as someone who is 
adopted by a family much like members of the family-in-law typically are. 
But the gradual nature of parentheticality can be perceived in many other 
activities as well. Think, for instance, in how seriously we take—or we may 
reasonable take—our commitment to certain goals. Consider the way that 
an amateur runner sets a goal for one of her ordinary training sessions and 
compare the seriousness of her commitment to that of her decision to run 
the London marathon this year. We can in turn see how this second com-
mitment may differ in seriousness and prominence in her life compared to 
some of her family or professional projects. The runner’s attitude toward 
these disparate goals and endeavors varies in seriousness and prominence. 
It could then be argued that those different degrees of seriousness and prom-
inence reveal to what extent the corresponding activity is regarded as more 
or less parenthetical, since the goal of an ordinary training session may be 
perceived as important in the context of that activity even though the im-
portance attached to it can hardly trespass the boundaries of this particular 
activity. There is, indeed, room for variation from one to another person, 
but someone who took the specific workout of each ordinary training session 
too seriously, who placed it at the center of her life and were thus unable 
to perceive that its importance is only relative to a certain context and 
therefore parenthetical, will be regarded as weird or even insane. Our  
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capacity to discern how seriously we can reasonably be committed to certain 
goals—and, thus, our capacity to acknowledge different degrees of paren-
theticality—contributes to outlining the boundaries of sanity or weirdness.  
 The previous remarks suggest not only that parentheticality is a matter 
of degree, but also that parentheticality may not be a specific standard 
feature of our relation to fiction as opposed to nonfiction. To confirm this 
last point, we may consider the experience of many pilgrims on Saint James’ 
Way. It is very common among them to share very intimate aspects of their 
lives during their long daily walks or when gathering in the evening to have 
dinner or a drink. One could say that in a few days one gets to know more 
intimacies about a bunch of people and get a deeper sense of bonding with 
them than with those other people that one has known for years. And, yet, 
this happens partly because of the parenthetical nature of the experience. 
Of course, while on the Way, pilgrims promise each other to meet after-
wards; in their normal life, so to say, but such later meetings rarely occur. 
And this is not an accident because the intimacy and transparency reached 
is favored—and, almost, enabled—by its parenthetical condition, that is, 
by the fact that it will have no direct implications for one’s daily life where 
one does not want to meet those eyes who know so much about oneself. 
Some may be tempted to regard those experiences of intimacy and trans-
parency as deceitful or fictional just because they are parenthetical but, in 
such a case, we should acknowledge that the way we relate to fiction is not 
just by contrast to nonfiction because sincerity is constitutive of the expe-
riences I am reporting. If, on the contrary, one should deny that the idea of 
a parenthesis is not a feature specific to fiction as opposed to nonfiction, 
then Friend still owes us a standard feature that might ground the idea 
that fiction and nonfiction are each other’s contrast class, for, if I am right, 
her contrast between the genres of fiction and nonfiction hinges on the op-
position between parenthetical vs non-parenthetical activities or experi-
ences. I must finally stress that the parenthetical experience on Saint James’ 
Way is far from exceptional and is to be found in various degrees in many 
other social practices, such as a therapy session, a teenager’s Summer camp, 
a trekking, a touristic trip, a club, and so on. All this suggests that, if we 
are to understand our relation to theatricality and works of fiction, we bet-
ter consider that those cases where fiction has nonfiction as its contrast 
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class as a rather specific attitude toward works of fiction and theatricality 
that lies at the extreme of a continuum with various degrees of reflectivity 
and estrangement. 
5. Conclusion 
 Friend’s theory of fiction, unlike others that seek to provide sufficient 
and necessary conditions, focuses on the ways in which we interact or relate 
to works of fiction, that is, the way in which we experience, understand and 
evaluate them. I do celebrate this opening of fiction theory to the plurality 
of our social practices. My concern is, however, that Friend’s approach may 
not have gone far enough in this respect, given that it is confined to an 
experience of fiction that views nonfiction as its contrast class. In defense 
of her view, Friend may take refuge in the idea that her research is not 
interested in the phenomenon of fiction as such, but only in the way we 
relate to works of fiction. Friend vindicates the concept of a work of fiction 
as autonomous and as trivially opposed to that of nonfiction, so that a the-
ory of fiction should only be concerned with a demarcation criterion that 
takes into account the disparate ways in which we relate to a work depend-
ing on whether it is fiction or nonfiction. I have argued, though, that the 
alleged autonomy of works of fiction, the sharpness of their contours, which 
Friend takes for granted, is not genuinely independent of the contrast view 
itself. To this end, I have examined some experiences of theatricality that 
have, at first sight, a bearing on the phenomenon of fiction and, in the light 
of Ulrich’s reflection on his conversation with His Excellency, I have sug-
gested that the contrast view may provide a reasonable account of the way 
the middle class relates to works of fiction but fails to express a more general 
truth about how we experience and evaluate works of fiction. 
 In sections 3 and 4, I have addressed some objections to the relevance 
of Ulrich’s remarks as a challenge to the contrast view. The first objection 
has been that, even though his Excellency’s performance may include el-
ements of theatricality, it can hardly be considered a theater play and, 
therefore, a work of fiction. I have thus explored a number of criteria in 
virtue of which Friend could distinguish certain practices and rituals, such 
as his Excellency’s conversations or a family meal, from works of fiction. 
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Yet, none of these criteria have been really useful. I have thus reached the 
seemingly extravagant conclusion that a family meal is a work of fiction. 
I have suggested, however, that our perception of their extravagance de-
pends on a way of conceiving of our lives as divided between the public 
and the private, between our working hours and our leisure time; in other 
words, it seemed that only parentheticality as an all-or-nothing matter 
stands in the way of recognizing some of our practices and rituals as works 
of fiction. 
 I have then argued, though, that parentheticality does come in degrees. 
I have thus dwelled on the different ways in which one can participate in 
a family celebration; in such circumstances, the degrees of awareness one 
may have of the script to be followed or the degree of pretense imposed by 
the need to adapt to a script that one does not feel fully identified with. 
I have distinguished occasions where one could feel like a genuine partici-
pant in a meal with one’s adopted or adoptive family, in contrast with the 
idea of being a member of a rental family, as comically depicted in Familia. 
If, in order to defend the contrast view, we insisted that we are only dealing 
with a theater play if we relate to the script of a family meal the way in 
which members of a rental family relate to each other; then we would be 
trapped in a vicious circle, since, on the one hand, we would identify a work 
of fiction on the basis of the kind of estrangement that is specific to this 
situation and, on the other, we expect our demarcation criterion to explain 
our ability to take this kind of distance. Moreover, I have suggested that 
parentheticality is a rather common phenomenon that is hardly confined to 
our relation to fiction or, complementarily, I have invited the thought that 
parentheticality is hardly a standard feature of our experience of fiction as 
opposed to nonfiction, contrary to what the contrast view defend. All this 
has allowed me to reject the contrast view and conclude that, if we are to 
understand how we experience and evaluate of works of fiction and theat-
ricality, we better consider that the experience of fiction as the contrast 
class of nonfiction is a specific way of relating to works of fiction that lies 
at the extreme of a continuum with various degrees of reflectivity and es-
trangement. 
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